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Does Capitalism Infringe Property Rights?
A Reply to Peter Morriss
CHANDRAN KUKATHAS*
Linacre College, Oxford
In a research note on 'How Capitalism Infringes Property Rights' {Political
Studies, XXXI (1983), pp. 656-61), Peter Morriss attempts to demonstrate
that a Nozickian version of rights theory is incompatible with that account of
capitalism which emphasizes the importance (and value) of entrepreneurial
risk-taking and entrepreneurial failure. Because bankruptcy is an accepted
consequence of entrepreneurial failure, capitalism, which condones
bankruptcy, in fact condones the violations of the rights of creditors. Thus
those who, like Nozick, defend property rights as sacred and inviolable, 'should
be in the vanguard of capitalism's opponents' (p. 657) Since the rights-based
argument for capitalism is that rights can never be legitimately violated, 'once
the rights theorist admits that capitalism necessarily condones some violations
of property rights—however little—he must either oppose capitalism or jettison
his insistence on the inviolability of property rights. Or, of course, both.'
(p. 661) While Morriss's interesting essay illuminates a number of issues
involving capitalism and property rights, this reply argues that he is wrong on
almost all counts. While rights violations may occur in capitalist societies,
capitalism does not infringe property rights. The paper attempts to show this by
identifying the weaknesses in Morriss's arguments to the contrary.
What is not clear in Morriss's argument is why a Nozickian rights theory is
incompatible with capitalism. Morriss summarizes the Nozickian version of
rights theory as follows:
(1) It is impermissible to do anything to another's property except insofar as
the owner of the property has explicitly contracted;
(2) It is impermissible to break one's contract, (p. 657)
This, he argues, is incompatible with the 'idealized account of capitalism'
which he provides on p. 656, which states:
No injustice is involved if some would-be capitalists go bankrupt. They
embarked—freely—on the risky business of enterprise, tempted by the great
riches that could be made; if they failed, whether through their own mis-
calculations or through bad luck, no wrong has been done to them.
(emphasis added)
* I am grateful to John Gray, Andrew Melnyk, David Miller and Emilio Pacheco for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Yet there is an injustice, argues Morriss, because the creditors of the bankrupts
have had their rights violated. Of course this is perfectly correct. But why does
this entail that capitalism infringes property rights or condones rights
violations? It is not at all clear that capitalism must condone these rights
violations; more particularly, it is not apparent that a rights based theory must
condone bankruptcies. Indeed, some rights theorists, drawing on Nozick, have
argued that bankruptcy law is an unjustifiable intervention in the operation of
the market, one which shifts the costs of economic activity from entrepreneurs
to creditors, and so introduces distortions in the capital market. Lawrence
White, for example, argues that 'Bankruptcy law is a system of interventionary
legislation which interferes with the ability of individuals freely to establish the
terms of loan contracts. It benefits the less prudent and less scrupulous
borrowers—indeed may encourage their conduct—while making their loans
costlier for the honest and conscientious.'' For a rights theorist this view is not
incompatible with the view that bankruptcy plays an important part in a free
market.2 In a free market the inefficient (and the unlucky) go out of business
and capital will be shifted until it can be profitably invested. But this in no way
implies that the entrepreneur is entitled to default on his payments to creditors
should he become insolvent. What encourages him to go bankrupt is laws
offering him the opportunity to discharge the debt. More precisely, it provides
an opportunity for the extra-contractual dissolution of debts and, in so doing,
reduces the incentives to internalize the arrangements concerning the burden of
loss in the case of bankruptcy. In the unhampered market, of course, parties to
any contract need not adopt a rule of strict liability. As White points out, loans
could be made on the basis of a "gentleman's agreement' with no repayment
obligations should the debtor go bankrupt.^ Or rules akin to bankruptcy laws
could be contracted, with provision to employ arbitration to settle details of
such cases. Quite possibly, although perhaps unlikely, the contracting parties
could even agree to bind the debtor's future earnings in the event of bank-
ruptcy. Morriss is quite right to say that neither 'history nor logic gives us any
reason to hope that bankruptcy can be avoided solely through the good sense or
virtue of the potential bankrupt, (p. 657) But he is misleading when he suggests
that '//7 the absence of external regulation he (the unsuccessful entre-
preneur) could continue making contracts until he drifted into insolvency,
(p. 657—emphasis added) It is the presence rather than the absence of external
regulation, in the form of laws favouring bankrupts, that has encouraged the
unsuccessful and the unscrupulous to drift into insolvency.
Morriss's observations that 'an account of the legitimate transfer of rights
cannot rely solely on the notion of sanctity of contract' (pp. 659-60) and that
the legal background of rules for adjudicating disputes on the meanings of
terms in the contract cannot be settled by contracting (p. 660) do not damage
my argument. Any system, as he notes, must have a noncontractual basis
(p. 660) and this background is 'crucial' and 'contentious' It is precisely this
' Lawrence H. White, 'Bankruptcy as an Economic Intervention', Journal of Libertarian
Studies, I (1977), 281. See also Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty {Athmic Highlands,
NJ, Humanities Press, 1982), pp. 142-4.
2 For an illuminating account of the importance of loss-making and enterprise failure see John
Burton, Picking Losers ? The political economy of industrial policy (London, Institute of
Economic Affairs, 1983).
' White, 'Bankruptcy as an Economic Intervention', pp. 283-4.
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background that is in contention here. My contention is that bankruptcy law
constitutes an unjustifiable intervention in the contract market—an interven-
tion which favours debtors over creditors and encourages rights violations.
This is not a characteristic of capitalism but is, rather, a paradigmatic example
of interference with individual freedom under capitalism.
Morris is quite right, then, to observe that 'a concern for property rights and
enforcement of contracts requires a very different set of laws' (p. 661)
Unfortunately, this, for him, means a system different from capitalism,
because capitalism 'requires a legal system which protects and encourages such
enterprising and risk-taking entrepreneurs' (p. 661) But surely it does not.
What it requires is laws which uphold private property rights; and among those
rights will be the right to negotiate and contract for the distribution of risk, and
the distribution of loss in the event of unsuccessful risk-taking. The importance
of this right is reflected in the fact that risk-taking is an unavoidable enterprise.
This is a point which Morriss fails to grasp when he writes: 'Under laissez-faire
we are forced to gamble when we contract, whether we choose to or not. And it
is safe to assume that we sometimes choose not to gamble, (p. 659) Indeed, he
suggests that people often act to minimize risk—for example by insuring
property against fire. Those who wanted to gamble, he suggests, would leave
their houses uninsured, or put their money on the horses. But this is plainly
false. Those who insure their property are taking a risk in attempting to
minimize risk. They risk wasting their insurance money. For example, if I
spend £10 insuring my house against fire I take the risk that, if there is no fire,
that £10 will have been wasted (except insofar as it bought some peace of
mind). Of course if I decide not to insure I risk losing more than £10. Here
laissez-faire capitalism simply allows us the choice of which risk to take (and
with whom). Under such a system, in which private property rights are upheld,
we are forced to gamble when we contract only to the extent that contracting in
any social system is a gamble because we cannot be sure that others will honour
their contracts, no matter how strong the disincentives to violate them. Many
legal systems seek to 'protect' us against risk by narrowing the range of options
available to us when we gamble, but this simply forces us to gamble on the
foresight (and the benevolence) of the person(s) limiting our options (risks). In
some social systems, individuals are allowed almost no options and they do not
so much gamble as become the passive subjects of chance.
While the rights theorists Morriss criticizes are strongly against the violation
of rights, this does not at all mean that they fail to recognize that, in any social
system, there will be some rights violations. For Morriss to suggest that rights
theorists must be against any system in which there is a risk of rights violations
(p. 658) is to go too far. Rights theorists do not want to condone rights
violations but neither do they suggest that it is possible to have a social system in
which no rights violations occur. (This would, among other things, commit
rights theorists to the view that punishment is never permissible, since punish-
ment risks violating the rights of the innocents who might be wrongly
convicted. No rights theorist, to my knowledge, holds such a position.) While
Morriss may have identified some problems in Nozick's particular account of
property rights, he is not entitled to claim that these difficulties are inherent in
rights-theory approaches generally. He is completely unjustified in taking the
further step of claiming that laissez-faire capitalism infringes property rights.
